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Drug violence in Mexico and its impact on the fiscal realities of bor-
der cities in Texas: evidence from Rio Grande Valley counties 
Abstract 
This study examines the potential spillover effects of the Mexican drug war and its associated violence on the fiscal 
realities of the U.S. border counties. Specifically, we study descriptively the data from the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) 
counties of the state of Texas, placing it within the broader context of all Texas counties, and find initial evidence of 
possible ‘silver lining’ spilling over from Mexican drug violence to the U.S. border counties’ fiscal positions. Housing 
activities increase and property tax reliance decreases in RGV counties relative to other Texas counties (both border 
and non-border). We anticipate that the findings and the suggestive evidence advanced by this study will motivate 
additional research efforts that can be potentially value-relevant in the policy responses from relevant U.S. authorities.  
Keywords: fiscal realities, property tax reliance, border counties, Rio Grande Valley. 
JEL Classification: M41, H83. 
 
Introduction 1 
The growing incidence of drug violence in Mexico 
practically possesses real spillover effects on border 
counties in the U.S.12In part, these effects are gener-
ally pronounced in the economic activities and the 
fiscal realities of these border cities/counties. There-
fore, this study examines a link between the fiscal 
position and migration (following the drug violence) 
into a major border region in Texas; i.e. The Rio 
Grande Valley (hereinafter referred to as RGV). 
Covering a period between 2000 and 2011, the em-
pirical data and preliminary descriptive results pro-
vide initial evidence on the implications of the spil-
lover effects of the drug violence on RGV’s host 
counties’ real estate landscape and revenue dynam-
ics. To this end, we review the population dynamics 
of the border counties in the wake of the renewed 
drug violence in Mexico cities and the spillover 
effects on the housing, revenue profile and the fiscal 
realities of the U.S. border cities/counties. Beyond 
the common negativities widely popularized and 
associated with the violence, our initial evidence 
suggests that in border counties, there might be a 
‘silver lining’ to the Mexico drug violence as some 
Mexicans’ ‘flight to safety’ and ‘flight to quality’ 
bring with them economic prosperity and investible 
capital into the U.S. In other words, because of the 
drug violence, Mexico is inadvertently forfeiting 
economic prosperity to U.S. border counties. 
Several motivations have been suggested in the lite-
rature driving households’ moves and migration 
activities. These generally include job, income, or 
family changes (see Wheaton, 1990 and Stephen, 
2009). In other words, the pursuit of better oppor-
                                                     
© Akinloye Akindayomi, Sergio Garcia 2014. 
1Throughout this study, reference to border counties is limited to coun-
ties that share border with Mexico. We do not mean counties that share 
‘border’ with other U.S. states. In essence, we mean Texas counties on 
the U.S. side of the international border with Mexico. 
tunities and economic prosperity is the chief driving 
force of migration. However, a situation where vi-
olence persists such as in the Mexico-U.S. borders, 
the urge to flee to security, economic safety and 
prosperity becomes more compelling and real. Un-
fortunately in some cases, violence is readily im-
portable into the otherwise peaceful U.S. border 
cities/counties. Schaan (2009) notes that in the ex-
treme scenarios, “…civil authorities cede entire 
geographic regions, and the lawless organizations 
develop enclaves of autonomy…”, creating econom-
ic orphanage in the border cities and counties of the 
U.S. Therefore, embedded in the economic forces, 
we add that heinous violence in locations with close 
proximity to a prosperous country like the U.S. is 
another real motive for migration that can impact 
economic activities in the host country and in par-
ticular, the fiscal realities of its border counties. 
While the spillover effects of such violence are typi-
cally perceived in the negative, we argue that poten-
tially, Mexico and its border communities cede both 
investment and human capital to U.S. border coun-
ties as a result of this culture of violence. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current 
study is one of the first attempts to explore Mexican 
drug violence, immigration and the implication for 
the fiscal realities of border counties in the U.S. 
Research efforts in this area are emerging and per-
haps constrained by data availability. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that the current study’s descriptive re-
sults will motivate additional inquiries and interests 
in this area of research. 
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. The 
next section (Section 1) which presents the literature 
review and framework provides a brief background 
of RGV and its counties. We then review the litera-
ture specifically in the domains of housing, immi-
gration and drug related crime and counties’ reve-
nue. In section 2, we present the data and discuss the 
initial evidence. Section 3 concludes the study. 
Public and Municipal Finance, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2014 
 52
1. Literature review and framework 
In this section, we present a brief background of the 
Rio Grande Valley (RGV) and its counties and then 
place it within the context of the study. Further, we 
provide the framework for the study by reviewing 
the interconnectedness among housing, immigration 
and drug related violence as well as counties reve-
nue and fiscal conditions.   
1.1. Rio Grande Valley: Brief history and back-
ground. The Rio Grande Valley (RGV) in southern 
Texas has developed from a largely agricultural 
community into one of the fastest growing Hispanic 
areas in the country.  According to the 2012 U.S. 
Census Bureau estimates, the population of RGV is 
over 1.3 million with approximately 80% Hispanic. 
It is made up of four counties namely: Cameron, 
Hidalgo, Starr and Willacy counties. The region has 
benefited greatly from the adoption of the NAFTA 
accords with growth in many different areas includ-
ing manufacturing, transportation, retail and con-
struction.  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive estimates that the total trade between the U.S. 
and Mexico was just shy of 500 billion U.S. dollars 
in 2012 but noted that Mexico was the U.S.’s third 
largest trading partner. 
In addition to the economic growth, many Mexican 
nationals continue to establish residence in RGV 
counties due to geographical proximity, economic 
opportunity, traditional and cultural ties as well as 
other demographic conveniences such as language.  
Many families in the area are divided on both sides 
of the Rio Grande River. Mexicans’ immigration 
into RGV, both documented and undocumented, has 
also contributed to the economic growth of the area. 
RGV counties are mostly Hispanic and incur specif-
ic financial attributions such as a low rate of bank-
ing residents and high rates of poverty.  These issues 
coupled with heightened security tensions in Mexico 
make RGV a unique and fertile geographical region 
for research/studies like ours. It is a place of great 
opportunity and growth that has unique issues that 
must be addressed independently of national studies. 
1.2. Housing. Flight to quality is a readily available 
option for many Mexicans in the violence ridden 
Mexico-U.S. borders. The U.S. is a quality haven 
for that purpose, and it is appropriate to assume that 
housing will be a leading quality investment product 
(either for residential or speculative investment pur-
poses) especially in the era of depressed housing 
prices following the ‘great recession’ of 2008. Case 
and Shiller (2003) assert that individuals find real 
assets investment to be safe and of quality consider-
ation. Engelhardt (1996) documents the link be-
tween housing wealth and homeowner consumption. 
Case et al., (2005) find that housing wealth effect is 
greater than financial wealth effect on homeowner 
consumption, as Campbell and Cocco (2004) add 
that such effects are more pronounced among older 
households. 
If one considers the concept of buyer liquidity vis-à-
vis the diminishing marginal utility for housing de-
mand, it is imperative that liquidity flight to safety 
will be amplified by more rather than less buyers; a 
dynamic strengthened by more Mexicans’ flight into 
the U.S. in the wake and continuation of the drug 
violence1. Typically, such a flight to safety action 
tends to mostly trend U.S. cities and counties along 
the borders relative to other parts of the U.S., partly 
due to family ties and other demographic conve-
niences such as language and cultural conformity as 
it is the case in RGV.  
Some may contend that due to this ‘export’ demand 
argument, border counties ought to lead the nation 
in improved house prices as dictated by the demand 
and supply interplay. We find some evidence from 
RGV housing data supporting such an assumption. 
Therefore, due to the ‘great recession of 2008’, we 
will caution on a wholesale acceptance of Wheaton 
assertion that “the supply of housing reacts relative-
ly slowly to changes in both market prices and va-
cancy…” because in a depressed market environ-
ment, supply is readily available in the housing 
market. Similar scenario characterized the subset of 
the period (2008-2011) examined in this study.  
The buying capacity of migrants in the U.S.-
Mexico border cities and counties in the real es-
tate housing market is real. The massive increase 
in the number of migrants from Mexico, both 
documented and undocumented, coupled with 
their low propensity to leave the U.S. and return 
to Mexico explain the need for migrants to settle 
and buy homes sometimes through proxies (Dube 
et al., 2013). Stephen (2009) in her review notes 
that the likelihood of an undocumented migrant 
returning home dropped sharply from 20 percent 
in 1982 to less than 5 percent in 20042.  
1.3. Immigration and drug related crime. Undo-
cumented immigration is widely believed to be as-
sociated with violence in border cities and counties. 
For example, border crimes decline following 1986 
amnesty but picked up again in the 1990s as undo-
cumented immigration recommenced. Coronado and 
Orrenius (2005) suggest that US authorities’ en-
                                                     
1 Employing Stein (1995) analogy, “one buyer with ten units of liquidity 
will probably not demand as much housing as ten buyers with one unit 
each…’ due to decreasing marginal utility of home ownership.  
2 Some immigration researchers cite heightened militarization and 
border enforcements as reasons motivating undocumented immigrant 
continued stay in the US as those reasons lead to costlier and longer 
journey of the migrant into the U.S. in the first place. 
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forcement mechanisms (even where effective) ac-
tually heighten violence in the border as an unin-
tended consequence of policy responses to undocu-
mented immigration. The authors maintain that 
“current levels of enforcement and the extensiveness 
of human and drug smuggling are the most likely 
dynamics linking undocumented immigration flows 
to border crime”; and that “migrant flows adjust to 
enforcement crackdowns”. This implies a possible 
positive relationship between enforcement crack-
downs and undocumented immigration. Cornelius 
and Lewis (2006) claim that heightened border en-
forcements make undocumented migrants to rely on 
human smugglers in order to complete their border 
crossings. Specifically, Cornelius and Lewis write, 
“even if migrants are caught, they keep trying until 
they succeed. Our interviews with returned migrants 
revealed that 92 percent of them eventually suc-
ceeded on the same trip to the border without return-
ing to their place of origin”. Payan (2006) provides 
further evidence that recent U.S. immigration and 
drug policy responses as well as the free trade 
agreement of NAFTA inadvertently aid contempo-
rary trend in immigration and drug smuggling1. 
Also, Bersin (1997) documents a link between un-
documented immigration and drug violence (see 
also Dube et al., 2013). Citing border patrol authori-
ties, he mentions that drug smugglers use migrants 
to transport some drugs as part of the smugglers fees 
for aiding migrants’ crossings across the border. 
Andreas (2000) further corroborates the fact that 
human smugglers are increasingly linked to orga-
nized drug trafficking organizations, (see also Acu-
na, 2007). This is important given the role of drug 
trafficking as a key source of violent crime, more so 
that Coronado and Orrenius conclude that violent 
crime is consistently the main component of border 
crime. McCaffrey and Scales (2011) posit that since 
2009, Texas has been progressively under siege 
from the increased activities of the Mexican drug 
trafficking cartel. This includes spillover violence 
and migration into Texas border counties.  
Notwithstanding, the strategic position of Mexican-
U.S. border locales to strong economic expansion 
and financial prosperity is well documented. Under-
standing that Mexico and the U.S. share almost 
2000 miles border locales, Adams (2006) sees Mex-
ican-U.S. borders as “a window on the future of 
binational relations and interdependence”. In fact, 
Payan calls for ‘open recognition of U.S.-Mexico 
integration’ leveraging on the ‘unprecedented eco-
                                                     
1 He also documents the consequences on forty-three border counties of 
Texas. He identifies four drug cartels: Tijuana cartel, Sinaloa-Sonora 
cartel, Juarez cartel and the Gulf cartel, claiming that “the large cartels 
now ride the formal NAFTA economy” with over $80 billion in profits. 
For more, see Stephen (2009).  
nomic, cultural and political convergence of the two 
countries (Stephen, 2009). Schaan (2009) summa-
rizes the significance of the two countries with a 
statement “…soon a choice must be made: either the 
two nations stand together in a common defense, or 
they withdraw into their own borders”.  
Thus, the insights espoused by authors like Payan, 
Stephen and Schaan suggest that it is almost imposs-
ible to untie the umbilical cord of cultural and eco-
nomic dependence that both countries (U.S. and 
Mexico) share. It must however be stressed that 
border communities of both countries will be mostly 
impacted by activities, events or shocks (such as the 
drug violence in Mexico) along the respective bor-
ders. Therefore, it is a worthwhile research effort to 
examine the impact of the drug violence on the fis-
cal realities of border counties; of which the descrip-
tive results from the current study preliminarily 
suggest a positive spillover effect.  
1.4. Revenue. Generally, cities and counties face a 
unique portfolio of revenue sources (often subject to 
budgetary and statutory constraints) in order to gen-
erate the necessary revenue to meet their statutory 
public obligations which majorly involves provision 
of local public services. According to Waisanen 
(2010), 30 states (including Texas) have either tax 
or expenditure limit or both.  Pagano and Johnston 
(2000) in their study of cities and counties revenue 
decisions note the constraining implications of ‘state 
control over local revenue authority’ on the revenue 
generation capacity of those cities and counties. 
They argue that the impact of such a control on ci-
ties/counties survival during economic downturns 
could be significant.  Dye and McGuire (1997) 
submit that such statutory restraints through proper-
ty ‘tax cap’ constrain (rather than ‘facilitate’) local 
governments fiscal behaviors and those of other 
‘local fiscal institutions’2. Property taxation appears 
to be a reliable and dependable source of local gov-
ernments’ revenue mix (see Sokolow, 1993) which 
among others depends largely on property values 
(much more on taxable values as opposed to market 
values) within their respective communities. How-
ever, in addition to state imposed constraints, there 
is an invisible interplay of interjurisdictionally im-
posed competitive constraint on the ability of cities 
or counties to expand tax revenue, since they are 
forced to pay attention to tax dynamics in neighbor-
ing cities/counties. In sum, taxing powers of local 
taxing jurisdictions are influenced by factors that 
include the health of the local economy, general 
state of the housing market, statutory constraints 
                                                     
2 For more on the impact of State’s imposition of fiscal restraints on 
local institutions, see Preston and Ichniowski (1991) and Poterba and 
Rueben (1995). 
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imposed by State constitutions, population, neigh-
boring taxing jurisdictions and other fiscal variables.  
There is a direct link between population growth 
and urbanization. Cities and counties are direct be-
neficiaries of the pros and cons of urbanization. At 
the least, local governments hope for neutral effect 
of urbanization, the opposite of which usually de-
mands increased spending on local services. Since 
four decade ago, Tees (1971) blames state govern-
ments for failing to empower local authorities with 
the necessary powers to handle the challenges im-
plicit in and associated with urbanization. This 
complex inter-governmental fiscal relationship be-
tween state and local governments no doubt still 
subsists today and it influences the revenue mix of 
local governments.  
In this study, we examine population dynamics of 
the border counties in the wake of the renewed drug 
violence in Mexico cities and the spillover effects 
on the housing and revenue profile of the U.S. bor-
der counties. We argue that U.S. border counties 
face challenges of ‘urbanization’ driven by ‘flight to 
safety’ from the heinous drug-related violence in the 
Mexico border cities. Therefore, it is empirically 
important to examine how those counties fiscally 
cope with such challenges. Our findings provide 
evidence that the spillover effects of the violence 
possesses some ‘silver linings’ on U.S. border coun-
ties especially in the property tax and sales tax 
areas. This outcome should motivate additional 
research efforts that can potentially be value-
relevant in the policy responses from relevant 
U.S. authorities.  
The significance of, and the ability of local govern-
ments to impact quality of life of local residents 
cannot be underestimated (Gyourko and Tracy, 
1991). In the hierarchy of authority and affinity, 
these governments are the closest to individuals and 
so their fiscal soundness is unquestionably relevant 
to their ability to meet local residents’ service-
demand priorities. These priorities include sound 
public school system, housing, security and other 
requisite infrastructure. Gyourko and Tracy find that 
cities fiscal soundness impacts their ability to pro-
vide quality amenities to their residents, which di-
rectly impact their quality of life. 
However, states (including Texas) have continually 
imposed fiscal constraints and shifted responsibili-
ties to counties and local governments in the recent 
past. Pagano and Johnston (2000) argue that such 
constraining interference from the state places sub-
stantial fiscal burden on cities and counties thus 
inhibiting their ability to carry out their financing 
and development programs to their residents. In 
order to meet their priorities, these governments 
usually increase revenue demand from local taxpay-
ers in the form of additional property taxation as 
other revenue/taxation sources (such as income tax-
es or sales taxes) usually face constitutional and 
statutory restrictions from the states authorities. In 
addition, placing such revenue burdens on local 
residents often produces political pushback from 
residents. Interestingly, border counties with active 
inter-border economic and transactional activities 
from non-residents may be able to enlarge the pool 
of potential taxpayers (usually through increased 
economic activities) and thus spread the revenue 
burden. It becomes more viable if border counties 
witness inflow of immigrants with decent economic 
purchasing abilities to acquire and own real proper-
ties within their jurisdictions, thus increasing prop-
erty taxation base (without rate increase) and the 
revenue derivable therefrom. Employment level of 
local residents is important in that irrespective of the 
county mix of taxes, the ability of residents to help 
meet such fiscal obligations depends on their in-
come level. Such a constraint could be relaxed for 
border counties as economic vibrancy (where appli-
cable) could be fuelled by crossing immigrants’ 
purchasing activities. 
To further accentuate the importance of property 
taxes in the revenue mix of local governments, Pa-
gano and Johnston (2000) note the fluctuation cha-
racteristics of sales and income taxes (relative to 
property taxes) during economic booms and down-
turns. It is therefore believed that property tax, rela-
tive to sales or income taxes, is a more dependable 
source with relatively less distortions to county rev-
enue base across all economic cycles. The extent of 
property tax reliance by a county or local govern-
ment can signal the extent of revenue diversification 
profile of such a government. As mentioned by Pa-
gano and Johnston (2000), a high reliance on prop-
erty tax suggests that such a government has lesser 
revenue diversification portfolio. Since property tax 
is the primary and dependable revenue source of 
many local/county governments, we will expect that 
county borders in Texas will have high property-
tax-reliance. However, a better scenario will indicate 
otherwise in that a lesser property tax reliance could 
mean a more diversified revenue mix, especially from 
sales tax (where applicable), without a decline in prop-
erty tax revenue. With such an outcome, it can be 
claimed that there is a positive spillover effect from the 
drug-induced violence in Mexico-U.S. borders on both 
the real estate and other economic activities generating 
sales tax income for the border counties. As earlier 
mentioned, these border counties need such increased 
revenue in order to meet the increased de-
mand/pressure on public amenities/services by addi-
tional residents fleeing the violence from across the 
border. Similarly, since the county governments in our 
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sample possess state authority to levy and collect other 
non-property taxes, specifically sales tax, residents are 
subject to higher revenue burden. This thus constrains 
the ability of local governments to impose or increase 
property tax rate or revenue without facing political 
resistance from local taxpayers. Hence, the importance 
of broadened tax base (from both property and sales 
tax) advantage from Mexico nationals fleeing violence 
into the U.S. border counties.  
2. Data, analysis and discussion of results  
Data. The data for this study are obtained from the 
office of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 
through a special request and arrangement1. In some 
instances, the data were hand-collected for meaningful 
analysis. 
The sample period covers year 2000 through 2011. 
These periods are chosen mainly to (1) correspond to 
the timelines of significant events surrounding the 
Mexican Drug war (2006 to 2011); and (2) allow for 
comparison of the descriptive results (pre – 2000 to 
2005; post – 2006 to 2011). It is believed that Mexican 
authorities renewed the fight against drug cartels re-
sulting in the accompanying violence in 2006 with the 
election of President Felipe Calderón. The newly 
elected President’s tough and aggressive stances 
against the drug cartel’s violence heightened the vio-
lent adversarial collision between the Mexican drug 
cartels and the Mexican authorities resulting in many 
collateral deaths. Certainly, for those who can afford it, 
flight to safety becomes the option to escape the esca-
lating mayhem.  
Due to cultural consideration (family ties, language) as 
well as geographical proximities, border communities 
in the U.S. become the natural destinations and ‘safe 
haven’ for many migrants fleeing the violence2. There-
fore, beyond the usual concerns of the negative impact 
of immigration (especially undocumented) on border 
counties, we examine the relevant Rio Grande Valley 
(RGV) data descriptively and find preliminary evi-
dence that there could be ‘silver lining’ from the spil-
lover effects of the Mexican drug violence on the U.S. 
border counties’ fiscal positions.  
To achieve this, we further examine, among others, the 
dynamics of changes in population as well as property 
values between border and non-border counties in the 
State of Texas. Hitherto, the results in the literature 
                                                     
1 Due to the fact that the data are not readily available in the public 
domain, we initiated a written request to the Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts and after some procedural steps and arrangements, we 
were given access. Copy of the approval and the data are available upon 
request from the authors.   
2 We do not distinguish between documented and undocumented immi-
gration in this study because we do not see the compelling need for such 
an arbitrary distinction to our study. 
regarding the relationship between city size (popula-
tion) and property taxes have been at best mixed. For 
example, while studies such as Dye and McGuire 
(1997) suggest positive relation, Song and Zenou 
(2003) find a negative relationship between property 
taxes and city population, thus creating urban sprawl. 
It remains an empirical question whether such migra-
tion leads to county sprawl as the recipient county may 
face increased flow of property tax revenue and also 
sales tax revenue thereby reducing counties property- 
tax-reliance3.  
The variables we examined include County Population 
(CP), Total County Market Value (TCMV), Total 
County Taxable Value (TCTV), Property Tax Reve-
nue (PTR); and Sales Tax Revenue (STR). With the 
exception of STR, we classify and compute the above 
mentioned variables into three categories namely: (1) 
RGV (Rio Grande Valley data); (2) WRGV (Texas 
counties excluding RGV); and (3) NonBorder (non 
border counties in Texas). The main difference be-
tween (2) and (3) is that the former includes other 
border counties in Texas while the latter consist of 
only non-border Texas counties. One rationale for 
including (2) is that although the RGV counties are the 
case study, comparing it with (3) reveals that the de-
scriptive results may be generalizable to other Texas 
border counties. 
Due to data availability, data on STR used to examine 
property tax reliance is only computed for RGV coun-
ties and for the period of 2008 through 2011. For the 
current study, property-tax-reliance is viewed as the 
ratio of property tax to sales tax (refer to earlier discus-
sions on property-tax-reliance). 
Results and discussion. Recall that our study covers 
Texas counties with emphasis on the Rio Grande Val-
ley border counties. Averages for CP, TCVMV, 
TCTV and PTR are computed over the sample period 
for each of the three categories stated above. Table 1 
and 2 contain the averages and the percentage of 
change in county information respectively for year 
2000 through 2011. However, Table 2 splits the data 
into Pre (2000 – 2005) and Post (2006 – 2011) analy-
sis period (refer to the rationale for setting up the Pre 
and Post analysis period above). Figures 1 through 4 
accompany Table 1. It is also worthy to note that all 
the variables in WRGV are slight higher compared to 
non-border. For example with respect to CP, it sug-
gests that border counties in Texas are experiencing 
higher population growth relative to non-border coun-
ties. Overall, it could imply that the preliminary find-
ings of our study may be generalizable to other border 
counties in Texas. 
                                                     
3 We use county sprawl to mean inter-county movements.  
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Table 1 – County population 
Year RGV WRGV Non-border 
2000 245,926.50 79,849.03 79,191.45 
2001 251,294.50 81,310.68 80,674.43 
2002 258,169.50 82,712.44 84,465.67 
2003 265,358.80 83,985.46 83,370.72 
2004 272,387.80 85,315.07 84,698.48 
2005 278,948.00 86,744.51 86,138.19 
2006 285,304.80 88,911.22 88,322.83 
2007 291,465.20 90,687.36 90,120.26 
2008 298,093.20 92,447.67 91,886.60 
2009 305,147.20 94,246.85 93,679.58 
2010 317,841.50 95,928.40 95,162.14 
2011 323,935.80 97,515.75 96,723.51 
Notes: *This table shows the averages of the county population 
for Texas counties. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; 
WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; *Non-border = 
Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. *Original 
data obtained from the office of Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts, Austin, TX. 
On average, county population (CP) for RGV Pre 
(Post) period grows by approximately 262,000 
(304,000) representing 16% growth. During the 
same period, CP for WRGV and non-border each 
increases by nearly 12% (i.e. 11.97% and 11.50% 
respectively). It is therefore safe to say that on aver-
age, the population of the RGV counties grows fast-
er in 2006 and beyond relative to other counties in 
the state of Texas. Similar trend occurs for other 
variables examined in this study (see Table 2). 
Table 2 – Percentage change in county information 
Panel A   
Post Change RGV WRGV On-border  
   
CP 15.88% 11.97% 11.50%  
TCVMV 62.78% 56.67% 56.35%  
TCTV 62.47% 54.57% 54.19%  
PTR 60.29% 50.70% 50.67%  
Panel B   
 P CMV CTV PTR 
RGV/WRGV 3.92% 6.12% 7.90% 9.59% 
WRGV/NonBorder 0.46% 0.31% 0.38% 0.03% 
Notes: *This table shows the percentage changes in county 
information. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV = 
Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas 
counties that do not share border with Mexico. *CP is the Coun-
ty Population; TCVMV is the Total County Housing Market 
Value; TCTV is the Total County Taxable Value; PTR is the 
Property Tax Revenue. *Panel A shows percentage changes in 
each variable between the Pre (2000-2005) and Post (2006-
2011) periods. *Panel B shows the percentage changes reported 
in Panel A across the counties. *Original data obtained from the 
office of Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Austin, TX. 
The data also shows that in RGV counties, the mar-
ket value of housing (TCMV) during the Post period 
is approximately 6% greater than Texas counties 
outside RGV (i.e. WRGV). In the same vein, there 
is 8% difference for taxable value of housing be-
tween RGV counties and other counties. On aver-
age, the property tax revenue of RGV counties is 
approximately 10% higher than non-RGV counties 
in the post period.  
 
Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the county population in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph for RGV vs. 
Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley coun-
ties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border =Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. 
Fig. 1. County population (CP) (2000 – 2001) 
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Notes: *This Figure shows the graph of the market value of the housing stock in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph 
for RGV vs. Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande 
Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. 
Fig. 2. Total county market value (TCMV) (2000-2001) 
 
 
Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the taxable value of the housing stock in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph 
for RGV vs. Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande 
Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with 
Mexico. 
Fig. 3. Total county taxable value (TCTV) (2000-2011) 
 
Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the property tax revenue in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph for RGV vs. 
Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley coun-
ties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. 
Fig. 4. Property tax revenue (PTR) (2000-2001) 
 
A careful look at the graphs in Figures 1 through 4 
reveals that there is a break in virtually all the graphs 
sometimes around 2007. Therefore, a further analysis 
is conducted to statistically test the slope of the graphs 
for each of the variables around the years of break 
(specifically for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008). The 
results are presented in Table 3. The following equa-
tions representing the tests of the breaks in those spe-
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cific years help contextualize the numbers and the 
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     (1) 
where: Y = CP, TCMV, TCTV, PTR individually. 
t = 2000, 2001, …, 2011. 
T = 1, if t ≥ T; T = 0, if t < Ƭ. 
T is the dummy variable that defines the year of 
break; Ƭ is the year of break, (i.e. Ƭ = 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008 individually). 
RGV and WRGV are as described above. 
The slope when T = 0 (T = 1) are individually 
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Where (β3 +β5) and (β4 +β5 ) are the intercepts 
respectively. 
With the exception of CP, the test of breaks in the 
linear trend forecast for all the variables are sig-
nificant from year 2007. The slope of CP is sig-
nificant from year 2006. In all variables, year 
2005 is not significant at the conventional thre-
shold (i.e. 95% confidence interval) and they are 
not reported for expositional convenience. Recall 
that the Mexico war on drug was renewed in 
2006, it takes at least one year for the effects 
(measured by variables listed above) to manifest. 
Though, the pattern of significance in the trend 
line slope for CP interestingly implies that the 
population growth is immediately captured in 
2006 at the start of the renewed Mexican drug 
war; it is realistic to expect that even if people 
flee the violence in 2006, it will take time before 
certain decisions on home ownership or related 
investments can be implemented1. 
Table 3. Test of slope analysis 
Panel A 
Year (Break) 
CP TCMV TCTV PTR 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
2006 807.751 0.010 -59748273.086 0.519 -95088737.071 0.253 -2326936.314 0.049 
2007 1014.260 0.003 -288804694.504 0.001 -292270373.618 0.000 -3687383.104 0.003 




Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
2006 813.890 0.016 -60042978.614 0.519 -95663094.657 0.252 -2323106.414 0.050 
2007 1019.029 0.005 -289656279.504 0.001 -293469603.157 0.000 -3689572.400 0.003 
2008 1267.461 0.005 -553172661.113 0.000 -517824104.758 0.000 -5708907.388 0.000 
Note: *This table shows the econometric test of slope. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley 
counties; non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. *CP is the County Population; TCVMV is the Total 
County Housing Market Value; TCTV is the Total County Taxable Value; PTR is the Property Tax Revenue. *Panel A shows the 
test results with border counties. *Panel B shows the test results without border counties. *Original data obtained from the office of 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Austin, TX. 
Figure 5 presents the property tax reliance graph. 
Recall that for the current study, property-tax-
reliance is described as the ratio of property taxre-
venue (PTR) to sales tax revenue (STR)2. For reasons 
earlier mentioned, the graph covers period of 2008 
through 2011. It can be observed from the diagram that 
the trend line is negatively sloped. This implies that 
during those years, RGV counties consistently have 
lower property tax reliance (a higher increase in 
STR), notwithstanding the increase in property tax  
12 
                                                     
1 It will be observed from Table 3 that β6 in all variables (i.e. TCVMV, TCTV and PTR) are negative with the exception of CP. Econometrically, it 
means that in variables with negative β6, the slope is flatter but steeper in CP with positive coefficient. Practically, this could be interpreted that while 
RGV counties encounter higher population growth relative to other Texas counties (border or non-border); it is not everyone that participates in 
home buying or related investments.  
2 During the sample period, the tax rates for both property tax and sales tax are substantially stable. Therefore, a change in tax rates is ruled out as a 
cause for movements in PTR or STR. 
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revenue relative to other Texas counties. A potentially 
confounding explanation for the increase in STR is 
that many Mexican nationals/residents frequent on a 
daily basis (with temporary visa) Texas border coun-
ties (including RGV) and make purchases that are 
subject to sales tax. These migrant visitors are general-
ly referred to as ‘Cross-Border Mexican Shoppers’. 
However, this is not of first-order concern to this study 
because those ‘visitors’ are entitled to the sales tax 
rebate (called ‘manifiesto’ by the Mexicans) that re-
funds the amount of sales taxes paid1. In fact, Mogab 
et al. (2005) in their survey of ‘Cross-Border Mexican 
Shoppers’, report that nearly 7 out of 10 respondents 
claimed that the sales tax rebate “was important” to 
their decisions to shop in the U.S. and that only 1 in 10 
considered it “unimportant”. 
 
Note: *This Figure shows the graph of the property- tax-reliance in RGV counties between 2008 and 2011. 
Fig. 5. Property-tax-reliance (2008– 2011)  
Conclusion  
This study examines the potential spillover effects 
of the Mexican drug war and its associated vi-
olence on the fiscal realities of the U.S. border 
counties. Specifically, we study descriptively the 
data from the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) counties 
of the state of Texas and find initial evidence of 
possible ‘silver lining’ spilling over from Mex-
ican drug violence to the U.S. border counties’ 
fiscal positions. During the sample period, we 
find that housing activities increase and property- 
tax-reliance decreases in RGV counties relative to 
other Texas counties (both border and non-
border). 
The renewed fight against the Mexican drug car-
tels following the election of President Felipe 
Calderón in late 2006 brought about unimaginable 
violence on the people of Mexico and for those 
who could afford it, fleeing to safety at safe ha-
vens in the U.S. becomes the readily available 
option. Typically, such a flight to safety action 
tends to mostly trend U.S. cities and counties 
along the borders relative to other parts of the 
U.S., partly due to geographical proximities, 
family ties and other demographic conveniences 
such as language and cultural conformity (as it is 
the case in RGV). Therefore, beyond the common 
negativities widely popularized, our initial evi-
dence suggests that in border counties, there 
might be a ‘silver lining’ to the Mexico drug vi-
olence as some Mexicans’ ‘flight to safety’ and 
‘flight to quality’ bring with them economic pros-
perity and investible capital into the U.S. In other 
words, because of the continued drug violence, 
Mexico is inadvertently forfeiting economic pros-
perity to U.S. border counties. This in turn im-
proves the revenue side of the fiscal positions of 
U.S. border counties.1 
We must acknowledge that the population growth 
in RGV may not only be attributed to flight to 
safety activities from violence; it could be be-
cause of growing economic opportunities in the 
RGV area. Also, this study focuses on the revenue 
side of counties fiscal profile. Looking at the ex-
penditure side is equally important. We anticipate 
that the findings and evidence advanced by our 
study will motivate additional interests and re-
search agenda in this important area of counties’ 
and local governments’ public and municipal 
finance. 
                                                     
1 One rationale for sales tax rebate is that the U.S. constitution forbids 
state authorities from levying tax on exported goods outside the U.S. 
borders. Therefore, sales to Mexican nationals that visit U.S. on tempo-
rary basis for shopping are deemed exports. For more on ‘manifiesto, 
see Mogab et al (2005). 
Property sales ratio 
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